Part 1: Critique of ITC’s five-year pashmina strategy

The strategy points in the right direction, but it is not yet detailed enough to justify its export target. ITC and the Government of Nepal correctly identified the main structural problem: Nepal exports pashmina products but has relied heavily on yarn imported from neighbouring countries, while fibre from many Chyangra goats has not been collected or used. The proposed response—training farmers, collecting and processing fibre in Nepal, spinning and weaving locally, and finding better markets—aims to keep more of the product’s value in Nepal rather than exporting the raw material.

What the strategy gets right

It starts with the underlying supply-chain problem. “Backward integration” means connecting the final product back to the farmers and raw-material producers. That is a stronger approach than focusing only on advertising finished shawls. The plan gives attention to farmer–manufacturer relationships, product quality, institutional coordination, and domestic processing. It was also developed through consultations involving government, business groups, and other stakeholders.

The early implementation makes sense. Nepal now has a domestic pashmina-processing facility, reported to process 3–4 tonnes of raw fibre a year. ITC also distributed about 1,300 combing machines, trained farmers, and helped establish collection arrangements. These measures address practical obstacles: farmers need the tools and skills to collect good fibre, and processors need a reliable local supply.

There are encouraging signs for farmers. ITC reports that production rose by one-third and that farmers received prices about 80% higher than before. It also reports that farmers sold an additional two tonnes of fibre in 2024 and that some Mustang farmers became shareholders in the processing company. These are promising signs that better local links can improve incentives and keep more income in mountain communities. They are not yet proof of a lasting, sector-wide improvement, because the figures come mainly from programme reports rather than independent studies.

Where the strategy is weaker

1. The main target is not explained clearly enough. The public documents give different starting points. One says Nepal exported $19.31 million of pashmina shawls in 2021; another says annual pashmina-product exports were about $27 million; a later ITC update gives $30 million for pashmina products in 2021. These numbers may refer to different products or ways of counting exports, but the strategy does not clearly explain the difference. That matters because the goal of $75 million by the end of 2026 would mean increasing exports roughly 2.5 to 3.9 times from those starting points. The documents do not show exactly how much of that increase is expected to come from selling more fibre, charging higher prices, producing more garments, or entering new markets.

2. Producing more in Nepal does not automatically create more buyers. Making yarn and fabric in Nepal could improve quality, authenticity, and local incomes. But it does not by itself create enough demand for Nepali pashmina in international luxury markets. The strategy mentions branding, trade fairs, target markets, and business-to-business contacts—meaning direct relationships with overseas buyers—but the public material gives little detail about committed buyers, repeat orders, pricing, or how Nepali producers will compete with established cashmere producers.

3. The processing bottleneck is only partly solved. Opening the first processing plant is important, but a plant processing 3–4 tonnes a year is small compared with a national export goal of $75 million. The strategy therefore needs clear targets for every stage: washing, removing coarse hairs, preparing the fibre, spinning yarn, dyeing, weaving, finishing garments, testing quality, and financing purchases before exporters are paid. The plan should measure how much of each facility’s capacity is actually being used, not simply whether a facility exists.

4. Expansion could be harder than the strategy suggests. ITC says the model could be extended to 12 more high-mountain districts. But each district will have different goat populations, pasture conditions, roads, weather risks, local institutions, and transport costs. Expansion will require animal-health services, breeding support, reliable collection points, trained workers, finance, and buyers. The public material identifies many of these needs but does not show a detailed budget, district-by-district timetable, or plan for what happens if fibre supply or overseas demand grows more slowly than expected.

5. The responsibilities are clearer than the accountability. The strategy sets out who is supposed to do what, which is useful. But the launch documents themselves say that implementation—not writing the strategy—is the main challenge. A stronger plan would name one accountable delivery team, publish annual targets and budgets, identify the lead organisation for each task, and report progress publicly. That would make it possible to distinguish genuine progress from general statements of support.

6. The claims about inclusion and sustainability need stronger measures. The strategy promises benefits for farmers, women, young people, and small businesses. ITC reports training 1,000 farmers, 36 local trainers, and 41 women in hand spinning. Those activities matter, but training numbers are not the same as improved livelihoods. The plan should also measure farmers’ take-home income, how much of the final export price remains in Nepal, women’s control over earnings, participation by poorer households, animal welfare, fibre traceability—the ability to follow fibre from farm to finished product—and environmental effects.

Overall assessment

The strategy has a sound sequence: collect more fibre, improve harvesting and quality, process more of it in Nepal, develop a recognisable Nepali product, and then sell it in higher-value markets. Its weaknesses are commercial realism and delivery. The $75 million target is not clearly connected to a consistent starting figure; the available evidence does not show enough about future buyers or processing capacity; and much of the public reporting comes from ITC and EU programme materials. I would therefore describe the strategy as promising in design, but not yet strong enough to serve as a fully convincing five-year export plan.

The most useful revision would replace the single headline target with a set of measures that can be checked each year: exports counted consistently by product category; tonnes of fibre collected and processed; the share of the final price retained in Nepal; repeat orders from overseas buyers; changes in farmers’ net income; women’s share of income; use of processing facilities; and a lower-growth scenario in case supply or demand disappoints.

This assessment is based mainly on official ITC and EU materials, together with the record of a midterm evaluation. I did not find enough independent trade, company, or buyer information to confirm the strategy’s economy-wide effects.

Part 2: How the plan fits with mountain stewardship

ITC’s pashmina plan can fit with mountain stewardship, but only if growth is kept within environmental and social limits. Its strongest feature is that it treats the mountain landscape and the people who care for the goats as part of the production system. The plan supports humane combing rather than slaughter, trains farmers to collect and grade fibre, creates local collection and processing, and aims to keep more income in high-mountain communities. This is more compatible with stewardship than exporting raw fibre while importing yarn and leaving mountain producers with little of the final product’s value.

The plan fits stewardship in four main ways.

Animal care. Chyangra goats are not killed for their fibre, and ITC’s training focuses on combing them humanely. But avoiding killing is only the starting point. A responsible programme should also monitor injuries, stress, the timing of combing before winter, veterinary outcomes, and whether higher prices encourage farmers to collect too much fibre or handle animals badly.

Keeping mountain communities economically healthy. Local collection, processing, and farmer ownership can make the pashmina economy more useful to mountain households. ITC reports higher production and prices, as well as farmer ownership in the processing company. But stewardship asks who benefits, not just whether total production rises. The programme should separately track poorer herders, remote settlements, women, and households with small goat herds.

Adding value without exporting the raw material. Washing, preparing, spinning, and weaving fibre in Nepal can create local skills and jobs and reduce the need to send raw material elsewhere. The first processing plant and training for women spinners support that goal. But local processing is not automatically environmentally safe. The plan should report its use of electricity and water, treatment of dirty wastewater, use of dyes, transport emissions, and disposal or reuse of fibre waste.

Managing the whole mountain landscape. The greatest tension appears in the proposed expansion to 12 additional districts. A successful project in Mustang cannot simply be copied elsewhere. Each district will have different pasture limits, goat numbers, climate pressures, grazing conflicts, transport challenges, and local decision-making systems. Expansion should therefore proceed district by district, after checking whether the land can support more animals and more fibre collection.

The central risk is that the export goal could grow faster than the mountain environment can safely support. The $75 million target is ambitious compared with the reported 2021 export figures, while the public materials describe production, processing, and market expansion more clearly than they define limits on pasture use, climate risk, water use, or protection of biodiversity. To make stewardship real, those limits would need to be part of the operating rules: no increase in goat numbers or fibre collection without evidence that pasture and animal health can support it; humane-harvesting standards linked to the prices buyers pay; a system for tracing fibre from district to garment; environmental requirements for processing; and a public report combining ecological, social, and commercial results.

The plan is therefore compatible with mountain stewardship in its basic design, but it has not yet fully secured stewardship through rules and monitoring. Its best feature is the connection between animal care, farmer welfare, and local production. Its key unanswered question is whether the sector can expand without exceeding the limits of high-altitude landscapes or distributing the gains unfairly.